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Technology and Pornography
Dawn C. Nunziato∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, legislators and industry players have
undertaken valiant efforts to employ technology to remedy a
problem that technology has created—the increased availability to
minors of sexually-themed content on the Internet. Legislative
efforts to restrict minors’ access to such content have relied on two
types of technology: adult verification technology and user-based
software filters.
Legislation relying upon adult verification technology, like the
Communications Decency Act (CDA)1 and the Child Online
Protection Act (COPA),2 attempts to zone Internet speech at its
source into adult zones and minor zones by requiring content
providers to ensure that minors are not granted access to harmful-tominors material. Such legislation requires that content providers (1)
segregate out their harmful-to-minors content, and (2) employ adult
verification tools like adult identification cards or credit cards to
ensure that minors are not granted access to such material.
The constitutionality of such zoning schemes depends on (1) the
level of sophistication, efficacy, and deployment of adult verification
technology and (2) the burdens that the required use of such
technology imposes on content providers and Internet end users.3
And, as with all content-based restrictions on speech, the
constitutionality of such schemes depends on whether there are less
restrictive but equally effective alternatives for achieving the

∗ Assoc. Professor, George Washington University Law School, B.A., M.A.
(Philosophy), J.D., University of Virginia. I am grateful to Dean Frederick Lawrence for his
generous financial support and to Professor Cheryl Preston for her comments on earlier drafts
of this Article. I am also grateful to Christopher Chapman, Michelle Rosenthal, and Bryan
Mechell for excellent research assistance and to Matthew Braun for excellent library research
assistance.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
3. See infra Part III.
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government’s interest. For example, challengers to both the CDA
and COPA pointed to the availability of software filters as less
restrictive and (at least) equally effective alternatives.4
Legislation relying upon software filters to restrict minors’ access,
like the Child Internet Protection Act (CIPA),5 does not regulate
content providers at all, but instead regulates Internet end users (or
intermediaries like public schools, libraries, or Internet service
providers (ISPs)), and essentially requires that these entities employ
filtering software to restrict minors’ access to harmful Internet
content. As discussed below, the constitutionality of such filtering
schemes depends on the sophistication of the filtering software, the
extent to which it underblocks and/or overblocks users’ access to
harmful content, and the burdens that the required use of such
filtering technology imposes on Internet end users.
The existence and efficacy of filtering technology have presented
a double-edged sword for legislators in their efforts to regulate
minors’ access to sexually-themed content. If technology like
software filters is found to be less restrictive than the adult
verification-based zoning schemes embodied in the CDA and
COPA, then the Supreme Court will likely strike down such schemes
because they are not sufficiently tailored to address the government
interest. Indeed, given their availability and comparative
effectiveness, COPA opponents have heralded software filters as a
less restrictive alternative—reason alone to strike down the statute.
If, as some have argued, software filters are less speech-restrictive
than, and at least as effective as, the criminal prohibitions on speech
embodied in Internet zoning schemes like COPA, then such
legislation will fail strict scrutiny.
Recently, an organization called CP80 proposed a different
means of using filtering-type technology to zone the Internet.6
Under this proposal, all Internet content would be classified by
content providers into one of two categories: “Adult/Harmful to
Minors” or “Not Harmful to Minors.” Certain Internet “ports,” the
rough equivalent of channels on television, would be designated as
Adult Ports and used for the transmission of adult content, while

4. See infra text accompanying notes 60–62, 73.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5), (6) (2000).
6. See Cheryl B. Preston, Making Family-friendly Internet a Reality: The Internet
Community Ports Act, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1471.
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others would be designated as Community Ports and used for the
dissemination of all other content. Individual Internet users would
then direct their ISPs to provide Internet content to them either on
all ports (Adult and Community) or only on Community Ports.7
Proponents contend that this legislative solution is superior not only
to previous attempts at zoning the Internet but also to previous
efforts relying on software filtering technology.8
This Article scrutinizes the various attempts to use technology to
remedy the problem of minors’ access to sexually-themed content on
the Internet, with an emphasis on the relationship between the status
of technology and the constitutionality of the government’s efforts.
The more effective user-based filtering technology becomes in
restricting minors’ access to sexually-themed content, the less likely
courts are to uphold other legislative means of restricting minors’
access to such content. In several leading cases, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that the effectiveness of user-based filtering software
as an alternative renders the government regulation under
consideration constitutionally infirm. Part II of the Article analyzes
the foundational First Amendment jurisprudence defining obscene
speech and the regulation of minors’ access to sexually-themed
content. Part III then examines the fate of Congress’s recent efforts
to regulate in this area, emphasizing in particular the current status
of COPA, the constitutionality of which has been under
consideration by the courts for the past ten years. Part IV analyzes
the constitutionality of the proposed Internet Community Ports Act
(ICPA) in light of the constitutional scrutiny that courts have
imposed upon prior efforts to regulate minors’ access to sexuallythemed content and the burdens the Act would impose on content
providers and Internet users.

7. See CP80 Foundation, Solutions: Technology, http://www.cp80.org/solutions/
technology (last visited January 10, 2008).
8. At the time of writing, the ICPA had not yet been introduced in either house of
Congress. See CP80 Foundation & Cheryl B. Preston, The Internet Community Ports Act of
2007, http://www.cp80.org/resources/0000/0013/Internet_Community_Ports_Act.pdf; see
also Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app.
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II. THE FOUNDATIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Defining Obscene Speech
Over the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has finely honed its
obscenity jurisprudence9 and its derivative jurisprudence of
obscenity-for-minors.10 While “obscene”11 speech, properly defined,
is wholly outside First Amendment protection for any and all
speakers and listeners, “obscene-for-minors”12 (or “harmful-tominors”) speech is that speech which only adults have a
constitutional right to access (and engage in). The government has a
legitimate13 interest in restricting underage access to “obscene-forminors” speech, but it does not have a legitimate interest in
restricting adult access to such speech. Therefore, in order to restrict
adults’ access to sexually-themed content, such content must be
found to satisfy the constitutional definition of obscenity.14
Several principles follow from this basic structure of First
Amendment jurisprudence regarding sexually-themed speech.15 First,
adults have a constitutional right to access (non-obscene) sexual
content that falls into the category of obscene-for-minors speech,
while minors do not. Second, the definitions of “obscene” and
“obscene for minors” speech take on critical importance, as they
separate First Amendment-protected content from unprotected
content. Third, because of the differences in the relevant First
Amendment rights accorded to minors and adults, the ability to
determine the age of the individual seeking access to content is of
critical importance. Because the definitions of “obscene” and

9. See infra text accompanying notes 18–28.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 16–18.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 33–34.
13. As described infra, it is unclear precisely what type of showing needs to be made by
the government in regulating minors’ access to sexually-themed expression.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 16–18. Sexually-oriented content can also be
restricted if it constitutes child pornography. Because it raises separate issues and developed
within a distinct line of First Amendment jurisprudence, the discussion of Congress’s efforts to
restrict access to child pornography on the Internet is left to others. See, e.g., Symposium, The
Fate of the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1993 (2002).
15. This analysis of obscenity and obscenity-for-minors law substantially tracks my
analysis in Dawn C. Nunziato, Toward a Constitutional Regulation of Minors’ Access to
Harmful Internet Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 121 (2004).
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“obscene-for-minors” speech delineate unprotected speech from
protected speech, these definitions are also of critical constitutional
importance. After struggling for decades to define a meaningful test
for distinguishing protected sexually-themed speech from
unprotected obscene speech,16 the Supreme Court set forth this test
in Miller v. California in 1973.17 In order for sexually-themed
speech to fall outside the protection of the First Amendment for
adults, Miller requires that:
(1) the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest;
(2) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and
(3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.18

In the years following this decision, the Supreme Court
repeatedly emphasized that Miller set forth the definitive standard
for regulating obscene speech.19 It is therefore important to focus
carefully on each of the three prongs of this test. If sexually-themed
expression falls outside Miller’s definition of obscene speech, adults
enjoy a right to access it,20 which the government cannot
constitutionally restrict or substantially burden.
Miller makes clear that obscenity is to be judged by a local
community standard, in particular, that of the average member of
the community, to assess whether the expression at issue, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest.21 This prong of the Miller
test grants local (geographically-defined) communities the autonomy

16. Other categories of unprotected speech include “fighting words” and “defamation.”
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (confining unprotected
speech to limited categories such as fighting words, defamation, and obscenity).
17. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
18. Id. at 24.
19. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S, 497, 498 (1987); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.
153, 155 (1974).
20. This is assuming that the sexually-themed expression also does not fall within a
constitutional definition of child pornography, which is another category of unprotected
speech. See supra note 14.
21. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30–31.
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to draw the line between sexually-themed speech that is to be
protected by the First Amendment within and for their respective
communities, and sexually-themed speech that is to be deemed
outside of the First Amendment’s protection within and with respect
to their communities.22 Thus, although it might reasonably be
believed that the First Amendment sets forth a national standard of
protection for expression, in the context of regulating sexuallythemed speech, the Supreme Court’s obscenity jurisprudence grants
local communities the autonomy to determine what subset of such
speech (if any) is to be deemed outside the protection of the First
Amendment within and with respect to their communities.
An inevitable concomitant of such community autonomy is the
potential geographical variation in the classification of speech as
obscene. Accordingly, the community of Salt Lake City may classify
as obscene and unprotected expression that may be deemed
protected and not obscene by the community of New York City. In
Miller, the Supreme Court acknowledged the inevitable geographic
variability of its definition of obscenity:
[O]ur Nation is simply too big and too diverse . . . to reasonably
expect that such standards [of prurient interest] could be
articulated for all 50 states in a single formulation. . . . To require a
State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a
national “community standard” would be an exercise in
futility . . . . It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read
the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or
Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in
Las Vegas or New York City . . . . People in different States vary in
their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by
the absolutism of imposed uniformity.23

Accordingly, Miller affirmatively establishes that local
communities enjoy the prerogative to determine what sexuallythemed expression is to be deemed obscene within their
communities. In addition, Miller grants local communities the
autonomy to determine what sexually-themed expression is to be
deemed protected within their communities.

22. But see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586–613 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring and Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing for a national community standard for
obscenity for regulating the Internet).
23. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30–33.
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Second, Miller requires that the government regulator
specifically set forth a list of sexual acts, the depictions of which are
unprotected if they are deemed, applying contemporary community
standards, to be patently offensive.24 The requirement that regulators
set forth this list with specificity helps to reduce the potential for
vagueness within obscenity statutes.25 This specific determination of
patent offensiveness, like the determination of appeal to the prurient
interest, is also to be made by the average member of the local
community.26 Thus, under Miller, both the assessment of appeal to
the prurient interest, and the assessment of patent offensiveness, are
inevitably subject to geographic variability.
Local communities’ autonomy to make such determinations is
not unfettered, however. In assessing local determinations of
obscene speech, the third prong of Miller requires that appellate
courts retain the power to determine whether such speech
nonetheless has redeeming social value—i.e., literary, artistic,
political, or scientific—and therefore, whether such speech is
protected by the First Amendment regardless of the local
community’s assessment.27 Because this determination is not made
by jury members, “the serious value requirement ‘allows appellate
courts to impose some limitations and regularity on the definition
[of obscenity] by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor for
socially redeeming value.’”28
In short, Miller embodies a principle of geographical variability
of the definition of obscene expression. Each community enjoys the
autonomy to determine whether sexually-themed expression is to be

24. Id. at 24.
25. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997).
26. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 576 n.7 (majority opinion).
27. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162–63 (1974).
28. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 579 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 873). Thus, even if
a less “tolerant” community made the determination that the book The Joy of Sex was obscene
and unprotected by the First Amendment, Miller requires that such determinations be secondguessed by the judicial branch, which has the responsibility of applying this Miller savings
clause to declare that the expression at issue nonetheless has serious redeeming social value and
is therefore protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160–61 (1974).
Accordingly, despite the fact that a local jury in Georgia, applying its state obscenity statute,
determined that the Academy Award-winning film Carnal Knowledge appealed to the prurient
interest and described sexually-themed conduct in a patently offensive manner, the court in
that case had the power to determine that the work nonetheless embodied serious literary
value. The court was therefore able to rescue the film from the jury’s classification of it as
obscene and unprotected by the First Amendment. Id.
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declared obscene and unprotected, or non-obscene and protected,
within the geographical boundaries of that community.
Determinations of obscenity made by communities, however, are
subject to an appellate court’s determination that such content is
nonetheless protected because it has serious social value.
B. Defining Obscene-for-Minors Speech
In Ginsberg v. New York29 and related cases,30 the Supreme Court
confirmed that legislators may constitutionally restrict minors’ access
to sexually-themed speech that is protected for adults, so long as
they are careful not to restrict adults’ rights (including adults’ rights
as parents)31 within such legislation. The Supreme Court upheld the
seemingly common-sense principle32 that minors’ First Amendment
right to access sexually-themed content is more limited than adults’
right to access such material. In this case, the Court upheld a New
York statute that regulated minors’ access to content that fell within
the statute’s definition of “obscene for minors.”33 The statute at
issue, which was primarily aimed at restricting the sale of so-called
“girlie” magazines to minors, prohibited the sale to those ages
sixteen and under of material that was considered obscene as to that
age category, even though it would not be obscene to adults.34 The
statute attempted to conform with Supreme Court precedent at the
time that required the inclusion of a savings clause for regulations of
obscene speech. Thus, the statute allowed for speech that had
redeeming social importance to minors, as well as a community
standards component for determining whether the expression was
patently offensive.35
In affirming this two-tiered, age-variable approach to regulating
obscene content, the Supreme Court first emphasized the right of
parents to direct the rearing of their children as “basic in the

29. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
30. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 37–40.
32. This principle was not commonsensical to the plaintiff in that case, who advanced
“the broad proposition that the scope of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a
citizen to read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend upon whether the
citizen is an adult or a minor.” Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636.
33. Id. at 636–37.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 646 app. a.
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structure of our society.”36 The Court observed that “parents and
others, teachers for example, who have this primary responsibility for
children’s well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to
aid discharge of that responsibility.”37 Finding that the prohibitions
in the New York statute aided parents (and those standing in loco
parentis) in discharging these responsibilities, the Court upheld the
statute.38 The Court also emphasized the fact that the statute’s
operation did not usurp parental autonomy to determine what
material was suitable for their children: “the [statute’s] prohibition
against sale to minors does not bar parents who so desire from
purchasing the magazines for their children.”39 While the statute’s
prohibition on the dissemination of obscene-for-minors speech
might therefore be thought to aid parents in the discharge of their
parental duties, a statute that went so far as to remove from parents
the authority to determine what material was suitable for their
children would be found to unconstitutionally restrict this aspect of
parental autonomy.40
The Ginsberg Court also recognized that, in addition to parents’
interest in regulating their children’s access to harmful speech, the
State enjoyed an “independent interest in the well-being of its
youth” that provided a separate justification for regulating minors’
access to harmful speech. The Court observed that:
While the supervision of children’s reading may best be left to their
parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot
always be provided and society’s transcendent interest in protecting
the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of
material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a
state to include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of
pornography to children special standards, broader than those
embodied in the legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of
such material to adults.41

In short, the Ginsberg Court held that the government can
regulate minors’ access to speech under a different standard than that
36. Id. at 639.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See text accompanying note 59.
41. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y.
1965) (Fuld, J., concurring)).
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by which adult access to speech is regulated, so long as certain
safeguards are included within such regulation. Such safeguards
primarily include those definitional safeguards set forth in Miller and
tailored to minors, including a patently offensive and prurient
interest analysis undertaken in light of contemporary community
standards and a savings clause for speech with redeeming social
importance for minors. The constitutional requirement of including
a savings clause in this context makes clear that any such regulation
must preserve minors’ access to expression that has serious literary,
artistic, scientific, or political value for minors. Such safeguards also
require that those disseminating sexually-themed speech will be able
to determine the age of prospective recipients of such speech, and
that adults’ right to access non-obscene speech (as well as their right
to consent to their child’s access to such speech) not be abridged.
III. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO REGULATE MINORS’ ACCESS TO
SEXUALLY-THEMED CONTENT ON THE INTERNET
Over the past decade, Congress has undertaken three major
efforts to regulate minors’ access to sexually-themed Internet speech:
the CDA,42 COPA,43 and CIPA.44 While the Supreme Court upheld
CIPA’s mechanism of encouraging schools and libraries to use
software filters to restrict minors’ access to such content, it has struck
down and identified serious constitutional infirmities with the CDA
and COPA. While the Supreme Court in each case found that the
statutes satisfied the first prong of the two-pronged strict scrutiny
analysis—by advancing the compelling government interest of
protecting minors from harmful sexually-themed speech—the Court
held that Congress failed to advance this interest using the least
speech-restrictive means possible.
A. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
Congress’s first attempt to regulate minors’ access to harmful
Internet speech was enacted as part of the CDA. Reacting to reports
that a substantial percentage of the content available on the Internet
42. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
43. Id. § 231.
44. See id. § 254. Because it raises separate issues and has developed within a distinct
line of First Amendment jurisprudence, I leave to others a discussion of Congress’s efforts to
restrict access to child pornography on the Internet. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 14.
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contained hard-core pornography, Congress sought to criminalize
the transmission and display of indecent materials that were available
to minors.45 The constitutionality of such regulation was complicated
by a number of factors. First, as a content-based restriction of
speech, the regulation would be deemed presumptively
unconstitutional and subject to exacting scrutiny.46 Second, given
the state of technology, such regulation inevitably restricted adults’
constitutional right to access non-obscene sexually-themed
expression. Third, even to the extent that it restricted minors’ access
to indecent speech, the legislation failed adequately to protect
minors’ right to access sexually-themed expression that was not
obscene for minors.
With Ginsberg and Miller as its guides, Congress in 1996 could
have and should have carefully crafted a regulation of minors’ access
to sexually-themed content on the Internet, while at the same time
preserving adults’ right to access content that was protected for
adults. Because Congress was not careful in drafting the CDA, the
Supreme Court struck down the statute.47 The CDA’s efforts to
regulate minors’ access to harmful Internet content were set forth in
two provisions. First, the CDA criminalized the knowing
transmission of “obscene or indecent” communications to any
recipient less than eighteen years of age.48 Second, the CDA

45. See, e.g., Dorothy Imrich Mullin, The First Amendment and the Web: The Internet
Porn Panic and Restricting Indecency in Cyberspace, http://www.library.ucsb.edu/untangle/
mullin.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
46. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (holding that
the government cannot restrict speech on account of its content, “subject only to narrow and
well-understood exceptions”).
47. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
48. Id.
Whoever—
(1) in interstate or foreign communications—
...
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly—
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or
indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under
18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication;
...
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
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criminalized the knowing sending or display to any person under
eighteen any communication “that, in context, depicts or describes,
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”49 The Act
provided certain affirmative defenses to these two criminal
prohibitions, including defenses for those who undertook “good
faith, . . . effective . . . actions” to restrict access by minors to the
prohibited communications and those who restricted such access by
requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified
credit card or an adult identification number.50
The Supreme Court identified several constitutional infirmities in
the CDA’s definitions. First, Congress failed to align the CDA’s
statutory definitions of unprotected speech with the constitutional
definitions of obscene and obscene-for-minors speech that the
Supreme Court painstakingly set forth in Miller and Ginsberg,
rendering the statute’s definitions of unprotected speech vague and
overbroad.51 Beyond the problems of vagueness and imprecision in
the CDA’s definitions, Congress also failed adequately to protect
adults’ constitutional right to access Internet expression that was
unprotected for minors but nonetheless protected for adults.52
Because of the formidable technological difficulties in ensuring that

47 U.S.C. § 223(a).
49. Reno, 521 U.S. at 860 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)).
Whoever—
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly—
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available
to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless
of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person’s
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent
that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(d).
50. Reno, 521 U.S. at 860–61 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)).
51. Id. at 874.
52. Id. at 875–76.
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Internet communications that are unprotected for minors are
communicated only to adults, the CDA’s provisions essentially
operated to restrict adults from engaging in and accessing expression
that is constitutionally protected for adults.53
In defending the constitutionality of the CDA, the Government
contended that the Act’s prohibitions, combined with its affirmative
defenses based on the use of age-verification technology, did nothing
more than zone the Internet into adult zones and minor zones.
Because adults were allowed to disseminate adult content to
recipients who could prove by use of age-verification technology that
they were adults, the Government asserted that neither adult
senders’ nor adult recipients’ constitutional rights were burdened.54
The Court disagreed.55 First, it upheld the district court’s finding
that there were no reliable means of age verification currently
available.56 Although content providers of adult material could
condition access on receipt of a verified credit card, the Court found
that credit card verification was effectively unavailable to a substantial
number of non-commercial Internet content providers. It found
further that “using credit card processing as a surrogate for proof of
age would impose costs on noncommercial Web sites that would
require many of them to shut down,” and furthermore, that reliance
on credit cards as proof of age would impose burdens on adults who
do not have credit cards who wish to access such content.57 Because
the CDA’s provisions restricted adults’ access to speech that was
constitutionally protected for them, the CDA “suppresse[d] a large
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive
and to address to one another.”58
Furthermore, the CDA failed to protect parents’ autonomy to
determine what material their children should be able to access. In
contrast to the statute upheld in Ginsberg, which permitted parents
to override the state’s determination of obscenity for minors and to
purchase “girlie” magazines for their children, the CDA effected a

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 876–77.
Id.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 874.
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complete ban on minors’ access to statutorily-proscribed materials
and usurped parental autonomy in this regard.59
In assessing the CDA’s constitutionality under strict scrutiny, the
Supreme Court explained that if there were effective means available
to restrict minors’ access to harmful material while imposing few or
no restrictions on adults’ free speech rights, the CDA would fail the
“least restrictive means” component of this analysis.60 In assessing
this component, the Court found that other, less restrictive means of
restricting minors’ access to sexually-themed Internet content were
or would soon be available. Specifically, the Court noted that
“currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably
effective method by which parents can prevent their children from
accessing material which the parents believe is inappropriate will
soon be widely available.”61 Because user-based filtering software62
presented a means of restricting minors’ access to harmful material
that would intrude less severely upon adults’ right to access
protected material—and upon adults’ parental autonomy to
determine which material to allow their children to access—the
Supreme Court concluded that the CDA did not embody the least
restrictive means of advancing Congress’s compelling goal of
protecting minors from harmful sexually-themed Internet expression.
Thus, in part because of the potential availability of a better
technological solution to the problem of restricting minors’ access to
sexually-themed expression (in the form of user-based filtering
software), the Court rejected the solution offered by Congress in the
CDA.
Justice O’Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
interpreted the CDA as a partially successful attempt by Congress to
zone the Internet into adult zones and minor zones via the use of
age-verification technology.63 Finding that “the undeniable purpose
of the CDA is to segregate indecent material on the Internet into
certain areas that minors cannot access,”64 she explained that
analogous zoning laws—at least as applied to real space—have been
upheld by the Court. Justice O’Connor’s analysis leads to the
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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Id. at 874.
Id. at 877 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (1997)).
Id.
Id. at 886 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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question of what type of zoning laws in cyberspace can withstand
constitutional scrutiny. First, as Justice O’Connor explained, a
constitutional zoning law must not unduly restrict adults’ access to
constitutionally protected material; and second, the content banned
for minors must be content that minors have no constitutional right
to access.65 That is, in order for a cyberzoning statute to comply with
the First Amendment, adults must have ready access to the adult
zone, which contains—and does not restrict or chill—content that is
constitutional for adults; and, minors must have access to the
minors’ zone, which contains all content that minors have a
constitutional right to access. Zoning or content regulations that
restrict or burden adults’ access to the adult zone, or limit the
content within the adult zone to that which minors have a
constitutional right to access, will be found unconstitutional. For
example, the Court found in Butler v. Michigan that a criminal
statute prohibiting the sale, to minors and to adults, of materials
“tending to the corruption of the morals of youth” was
unconstitutional because it collapsed the minors’ zone and the adult
zone.66 In contrast, in Ginsberg v. New York, the sale of “girlie”
magazines was prohibited only as to minors; the statute preserved
adults’ constitutional right to access the adult zone by allowing them
to purchase such non-obscene, sexually-themed content.67
Accordingly, in order for a statute to constitutionally create adult
zones and minor zones on the Internet, it needs to: (1) preserve
adults’ unburdened access to the full panoply of content that adults
have a right to access; (2) grant minors access to the range of
content that they have a constitutional right to access; and (3)
incorporate a method of distinguishing between adult and minor
Internet users that does not impose a burden on adults seeking to
disseminate or to access protected-for-adults content. Although
Justice O’Connor explained that legislation that created such adult
and minor zones on the Internet in the above manner would be
constitutional, she concluded that the CDA did not meet this
constitutional requirement.68

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 888.
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1957).
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968).
Reno, 521 U.S. at 896–97 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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B. The Child Online Protection Act of 1998—Round One
Shortly after the Supreme Court struck down the relevant
provisions of the CDA, Congress went back to the drawing board,
this time directing its attention to the applicable Supreme Court
obscenity (and obscenity-for-minors) jurisprudence. Legislators
focused in particular on Miller’s three-pronged test, as modified for
minors by Ginsberg, and put forward a more serious effort at
constitutionally regulating minors’ access to harmful Internet speech.
In COPA, Congress carefully imported the three prongs of the
Miller test into its regulation, while also incorporating an agedependent standard for determining harmful material, as sanctioned
by Ginsberg.69 And, like the CDA, COPA also provides an affirmative
defense for those who in good faith restrict minors’ access to
material that is harmful to minors, by use of credit cards, adult codes,
and other “reasonable measures that are feasible under available
technology.”70 If one compares the requisite constitutional definition
of obscenity set forth in Miller, and modified in Ginsberg, with the
definition of “harmful to minors” set forth in COPA, one might
predict that the statute would readily withstand constitutional
scrutiny. As discussed below, in reviewing the constitutionality of

69. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000). The relevant provisions of COPA are as follows:
(a)(1) Prohibited conduct—
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in
interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than
$50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.
....
(e)(6) Material that is harmful to minors—
The term “material that is harmful to minors” means any communication,
picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter
of any kind that is obscene or that—
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is
designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of
the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.
47 U.S.C. § 231 (emphasis added).
70. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 570 (2002).
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COPA, however, the courts have found substantial constitutional
flaws in other aspects of the statute’s definition and application to
Internet content. At each level of review, courts have found different
aspects of COPA to be constitutionally infirm. The Supreme Court
has ruled twice on the constitutionality of COPA, and it will likely
grant certiorari soon to make a final determination of the statute’s
constitutionality.71 The district court, in reviewing COPA and in
response to the ACLU’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the statute,
emphasized the burdens that the statute imposed on speakers and
publishers of sexually-themed, protected-for-adults expression. The
court found that these burdens were substantial enough to render
the statute unconstitutional.72 The court further held that, as with
the CDA, Congress failed to establish that COPA embodied the least
restrictive means of regulating minors’ access to harmful-to-minors
material, because “blocking or filtering technology may be at least as
successful as COPA would be in restricting minors’ access to harmful
material online without imposing the burden on constitutionally
protected speech that COPA imposes on adult users or Web site
operators.”73 Accordingly, in its initial assessment of COPA’s
constitutionality, the district court concluded that COPA failed to
withstand constitutional scrutiny because user-based filtering
software was less speech-restrictive, yet equally effective means of
achieving a compelling government interest.
On appeal, the Third Circuit emphasized a different aspect of the
Supreme Court’s obscenity jurisprudence—one that goes to the
heart of regulating obscene and obscene-for-minors content on the
Internet, viz., the autonomy of local communities to determine the
contours of obscene (and obscene-for-minors) speech within their
communities.74 As discussed above, Miller’s first prong requires that
there be an inquiry into whether the average member of a
community, applying that community’s contemporary standards,
would find that the work appeals to the prurient interest.75 Miller’s
second prong (implicitly) carries over this communitarian inquiry to
the assessment of whether the expression is patently offensive.76
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See infra Part III.D.
ACLU v. Reno (COPA I), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495–97 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
Id. at 497.
See ACLU v. Reno (COPA II), 217 F.3d 162, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2000).
See text accompanying notes 21–23.
See text accompanying notes 24–26.
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These required communitarian analyses would permit a jury in a
community such as Salt Lake City to classify certain content as
obscene and unprotected within its local community, where such
speech might very well be deemed protected by another local
community, such as New York City.77 While this constitutionallyrequired, geographically-based determination of obscenity can
operate to separate protected from unprotected expression in real
space, this geographic variability becomes problematic when applied
to expression on the Internet. Given the meaningful geographic
boundaries in real space, it is feasible for Salt Lake City to effectively
exclude expression contained in books, magazines, or videos that it
considers obscene according to its local community standards.
Likewise, it is feasible, even if somewhat burdensome for distributors
of sexually-themed expression contained in books, magazines,
videos, mailings, etc., to take steps to restrict the dissemination of
such works into communities that consider such works to be
obscene, in order to avoid being prosecuted for purveying obscenity
within less “tolerant” communities. And, by exercising its right
under Miller to determine the contours of obscenity within its local
community, Salt Lake City does not necessarily restrict the ability of
other communities to determine for themselves the contours of
obscenity within their communities.
Given the absence of meaningful boundaries delimiting one local
community from another within cyberspace, however, it becomes far
more difficult for individual communities to determine the contours
of obscenity within their borders without substantial spillover to
other communities. Because it is not feasible for an Internet
publisher of sexually-themed expression to restrict the dissemination
of its expression only to those local communities that would likely
not find such expression to be obscene, Internet publishers have only
one realistic alternative to avoid being subject to obscenity
prosecution—forgo dissemination of such expression on the Internet
altogether.78 Given the practical inability of Web publishers to

77. These communitarian analyses are subject to the judicially-determined floor
described above. See text accompanying notes 27–28.
78. For example, it might come to pass that a Salt Lake City jury would find that a
particular Web site was obscene for minors under a Miller/Ginsberg definition of obscenity,
such as set forth in COPA. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). If
so, the only meaningful option for the Internet publisher of such material would be to take
down such expression altogether for all communities throughout the United States (and
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restrict the dissemination of expression by geographical location, one
community’s determination of obscenity spills over to all other
communities, thereby impinging upon these other communities’
autonomy to determine the contours of obscene and obscene-forminors expression for themselves.
Addressing this issue, the Third Circuit held that the conflict
between (1) the prerogative of a community to determine the
boundary between obscene-for-minors speech and non-obscene-forminors speech and (2) the inability to control the geographic
dissemination of Internet content, was so severe as to render
COPA’s reliance on contemporary community standards
constitutionally intolerable.79 Accordingly, the Third Circuit struck
down COPA as unconstitutional on these grounds alone.80
Writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas
rejected the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the conflict between
Miller’s requirement of community-determined standards of
obscenity and the inability to limit dissemination geographically on
the Internet rendered COPA unconstitutional on its face.81 Justice
Thomas explained that the Supreme Court historically has subjected
speakers and publishers disseminating their content to nationwide
audiences to potentially varying community standards of obscenity,
and that “requiring a speaker disseminating material to a national
audience to observe varying community standards does not violate
the First Amendment.”82 Those mailing materials to a nationwide
audience,83 as well as those operating commercial dial-a-porn
operator services,84 for example, have been subject to potentially
varying local community standards under the Supreme Court’s
obscenity jurisprudence. Referring to these earlier obscenity cases,
Justice Thomas observed:

indeed the world), even though some other communities, applying their contemporary
community standards, would conclude that such expression was protected by the First
Amendment and that members of their community had a First Amendment right to access
such material.
79. COPA II, 217 F.3d 162, 173–76 (3d Cir. 2000).
80. Id.
81. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 580 (2002).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 581.
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There is no constitutional barrier under Miller to prohibiting
communications that are obscene in some communities under local
standards even though they are not obscene in others. [For
example, if dial-a-porn operator] Sable’s audience is comprised of
different communities with different local standards, Sable
ultimately bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on
obscene messages.85

The Third Circuit had held that these earlier obscenity cases
involving different mediums of expression were distinguishable from
COPA because the defendants in the earlier cases could control the
geographic distribution of their material, whereas Internet publishers
have no comparable control.86 Justice Thomas rejected this
distinction, explaining that in none of these earlier cases was “the
speaker’s ability to target the release of material into particular
geographic areas integral to the legal analysis.”87
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, who concurred in the
judgment, disagreed. They found that the Court of Appeals’
emphasis on COPA’s incorporation of varying community standards
was not misplaced, and they expressed concern about the conflict
between geographical variability in the definition of obscene-forminors speech and the inability of Internet publishers and speakers to
control the geographic dissemination of their speech.88 These
Justices emphasized that Miller’s contemporary community
standards test grants individual communities the autonomy to
determine what speech is and is not protected within their borders
and observed that “variation in community standards constitutes a
particular burden on Internet speech.”89
Yet, because the case involved a facial challenge to COPA—
before it had been applied to restrict any speech whatsoever—the
concurring Justices ultimately concluded that those challenging the
statute at this stage had failed to meet their burden of identifying
what, if any, speech would be unconstitutionally burdened by the
statute.90 Although they observed that the national variation in

85. Id. (quoting Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125–26 (1989))
(emphasis omitted).
86. Id. at 573.
87. Id. at 582.
88. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 602.
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community standards constituted a particular burden on Internet
speech, the concurring Justices found the Third Circuit’s conclusion
to be premature absent a comprehensive and careful analysis of the
burdened speech.91
On remand, the lower courts were charged with expanding the
focus of their inquiry into the constitutionality of COPA beyond the
effect of the national variation in community standards on sexuallythemed Internet expression.92
C. The Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2000
In the meantime, faced with the hostile judicial reception to the
zoning schemes embodied in the CDA and COPA, Congress
undertook a software filtering-based approach in CIPA. Enacted in
2000, CIPA operates by conditioning public schools’ and libraries’
eligibility to receive certain federal funds upon their implementation
of filtering software to block access to harmful sexual expression on
the Internet.93 Within the regulatory scheme contemplated by CIPA,
each community, acting through its community-based institutions,
theoretically enjoys a measure of autonomy to determine for its own
community the contours of obscene and obscene-for-minors
expression. This determination is to be effectuated through the use
of filtering software configured to block expression that falls within
the definitions of speech that is harmful to minors set forth by the
community-based institution itself (i.e., the public school or library).
As such, CIPA’s regulatory scheme enables communities to impose
their “contemporary community standards” with respect to obscene
content harmful to minors, in a way that potentially overcomes the
constitutional obstacles94 that the courts identified in COPA.
Under the CIPA scheme, each public elementary and secondary
school and each public library theoretically enjoys the autonomy to
determine what type of Internet speech is obscene and what type of
Internet speech is obscene for minors. As a theoretical matter, under
CIPA, each community, acting through its public schools and
libraries, is permitted to specify the parameters of protected and
unprotected speech, for minors and for adults, and to implement

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 586 (plurality opinion).
See generally 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000).
See supra Part III.B.
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these parameters by configuring filtering software—to be used by
members of its community only within the community’s public
libraries and schools—to effectuate these restrictions. Thus, CIPA’s
scheme quite nicely resolves the seemingly intractable problems to
implementing a Miller-based constitutional regulation of minors’
access to obscene speech by allowing each community to determine
the contours of protected and unprotected speech for its community,
thereby protecting community autonomy and substantially limiting
community-to-community spillover of such determinations. As
discussed below, however, despite the fact that CIPA’s basic
regulatory scheme embodies great promise for achieving a
constitutional regulation of minors’ access to harmful speech, the
details of this scheme have proven problematic.
CIPA conditions public schools’ and libraries’ receipt of certain
federal subsidies on their use of software filters. In order to receive
grants under the Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) or
“E-rate” discounts for Internet access and support under the
Telecommunications Act, public libraries and schools are required to
certify that they are using “technology protection measures” that
prevent patrons from accessing visual depictions that are “obscene,”
“child pornography,” or in the case of minors, “harmful to
minors.”95 While CIPA’s scheme allows library officials under certain
circumstances to disable software filters for certain patrons engaged
in bona fide research or other lawful purposes, the disabling of such
filters on computers used by minors is prohibited if the library or
school receives E-rate discounts.96
CIPA modifies the federal E-rate program, under which
telecommunications carriers are required to provide high-speed
Internet access and related services to public schools and libraries at
discount rates. CIPA also requires that a library “having one or more
computers with Internet access may not receive services at discount
rates” unless the library certifies that it is
enforcing a policy of Internet safety for minors that includes
monitoring the online activities of minors and the operation of a
technology protection measure with respect to any of its computers

95. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(B) (2000).
96. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6777(c) (2002); 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(3) (2003). The disabling
provision in the context of E-rate discounts applies only “during use by an adult.” 47 U.S.C. §
254(h)(5)(D) (2000).
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with Internet access that protects against access through such
computers to visual depictions that are— (I) obscene; (II) child
pornography; or (III) harmful to minors; and (ii) . . . enforcing the
operation of such technology protection measure during any use of
such computers by minors.97

Thus, libraries and schools, in order to receive E-rate discounts,
must certify that, during any use of Internet-accessible computers by
minors (i.e., those sixteen years of age and under98), filtering
technology is being used to block access to obscene material, child
pornography, and material that is “harmful to minors.”99 While the
terms “obscene”100 and “child pornography”101 are given their
(constitutionally acceptable) standard meanings, CIPA defines
material that is “harmful to minors” as
[A]ny picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction
that—
(i) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a
prurient interest in nudity, sex, or excretion;
(ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way
with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or
simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated
normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the
genitals; and
(iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value as to minors.102

Although the third prong of the harmful-to-minors definition by
its terms provides a savings clause for material that appellate courts
determine possesses redeeming social value, CIPA appears to
prohibit federal interference in local determinations regarding what
Internet content is appropriate for minors:
A determination regarding what matter is inappropriate for minors
shall be made by the school board, local educational agency,
library, or other authority responsible for making the

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(D) (2000).
Id. § 254(h)(7)(D).
Id. § 254(h)(7)(G).
Id. § 254(h)(7)(E).
Id. § 254(h)(7)(F).
Id. § 254(h)(7)(G).
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determination. No agency or instrumentality of the United States
Government may—
(A) establish criteria for making such determination;
(B) review the determination made by the certifying
[entity] . . . ; or
(C) consider the criteria employed by the certifying [entity] . . .
in the administration of [CIPA’s requirements].103

Additionally, as a further condition on its receipt of E-rate
discounts, a library or school must certify that, during any use of
Internet-accessible computers—by minors or by adults, including
staff members—it is “enforcing a policy of Internet safety that
includes the operation of a technology protection measure with
respect to any of its computers with Internet access that protects
against access through such computers to visual depictions that are—
(I) obscene; or (II) child pornography . . . .”104 Thus, a library or
school, in order to receive E-rate discounts, must further certify that
it is using filtering technology to block access to obscene and child
pornographic materials during any use of computers with internet
access.
With respect to adult use of Internet-accessible computers, CIPA
provides that a library official is permitted to “disable the technology
protection measure concerned, during use by an adult, to enable
access for bona fide research or other lawful purpose.”105
Importantly, however, CIPA’s amendments to the E-rate program
do not permit libraries or schools to disable filters to enable bona
fide research or other lawful use for minors.106
In sum, CIPA requires that public libraries and schools, as a
condition of receiving federal funding under the E-rate program, (1)
utilize filtering software to block adults’ access to obscene and child
pornographic visual content, and (2) utilize filtering software to
block minors’ Internet access to the above content as well as to visual
content that is harmful to minors. Although the filtering of adults’
Internet access may be disabled for bona fide research or other lawful
purposes, such disabling is not permitted for minors.

103.
104.
105.
106.
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CIPA’s modifications to the LSTA program generally track its
modifications to the E-rate program. CIPA amends the LSTA to
require that the funds made available under the Act will not be
available unless the library has in place and is enforcing “a policy of
Internet safety for minors that includes the operation of a technology
protection measure with respect to any of its computers with
Internet access” that protects against access through such computers
of certain types of content.107 When such computers are “in use by
minors,” the library must protect against access to visual depictions
that are considered to be “obscene,” “child pornography,” or are
“harmful to minors.”108 During any use of its computers, the library
must use filtering software to protect against access to visual
depictions that are “obscene” or “child pornography” in order to
receive such funds.109 In addition, the definition of the term
“harmful to minors” in CIPA’s amendment to the LSTA program is
similar to the definition found in the amendment to the E-rate
program.110 CIPA’s amendment to the LSTA, like its amendment of
the E-rate program, allows for library officials to disable filtering in
order to “enable access for a bona fide research or other lawful
purposes.”111 But the E-rate disabling provisions do not permit the
disabling of filters during use by minors.112
CIPA’s definition of material that is harmful to minors embodies
the constitutionally necessary elements set forth by the Supreme
Court in Miller. And, by enabling local community-based
institutions to decide for their communities what material is harmful
to minors within their communities, CIPA advances Miller’s goal of
granting local communities the autonomy to determine the scope of
protected and unprotected speech within their communities, thus
resolving the problem of community-to-community spillover
identified by the Third Circuit in its initial consideration of the
COPA case.

107.
108.
109.
110.
(2000).
111.
112.

20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) (2003).
Id.
Id. § 9134(f)(1)(B).
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G) (2000), with 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(7)(B)
20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(3) (2003).
Id.
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In order to understand the constitutional issues at stake in CIPA,
it is important to understand the mechanics of software filtering.113
Filtering software programs operate by blocking Internet users’
access to certain Web sites as follows:
When a person types in [an Internet address or Uniform Resource
Locator (URL)] indicating material they wish to read, the [filtering
software] examines various parts of the URL against its internal
blacklist to see if the URL is forbidden.
....
If the [URL] is found on the blacklist . . . then the program looks
to see how extensively it should be banned [i.e., whether to
blacklist the whole domain, a directory of the site, or only a
particular file on the site].
....
Blacklists can have multiple categories of banned sites (e.g. one for
“Sex,” another for “Drugs,” perhaps another for “Rock & Roll,”
and so on) , . . . But blacklists are almost always secret, so there’s
no way to know what sites are actually in the category.
....
The whole list-matching process above may be repeated all over
again against exception lists or “whitelists.” A few products consist
only of whitelists, or can work in whitelist-only mode. [Some
filtering software] can be set . . . so that everything not prohibited
is permitted (blacklist-only), or only that which is explicitly allowed
is permitted (whitelist-only). And of course the whitelist can
override the blacklist. In general, such blacklist/whitelist settings
are standard in server-level programs, along with the ability to
create additional organization-specific blacklists or whitelists.114

113. My discussion of software filtering follows closely that provided by filtering experts
Seth Finkelstein and Lee Tien in their extremely lucid article Blacklisting Bytes, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Mar. 6, 2001, http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Censorware/
20010306_eff_nrc_paper1.html; see also R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83
MINN. L. REV. 755 (1999) (describing the essential features of software filters).
114. Finkelstein & Tien, supra note 113.
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The default blacklists and whitelists used by filtering software
programs are created by the software developers and constitute a
substantial portion of the programs’ value to consumers. As such,
these lists are typically protected as trade secrets.115 Thus, a library
implementing a filtering software program typically has no way of
knowing which Web sites will actually be rendered inaccessible by
the filtering software program. Although the library may choose to
configure the filtering software to filter out certain pre-defined
categories of Web sites (such as “Adult/Sexually Explicit”116), it has
no way of knowing the criteria used by the software developers to
select which Web sites fall into this category, nor which Web sites
will actually fall within this category.
The constitutionality of CIPA was initially considered by a
special three-judge panel, which found first that the filtering software
programs mandated by CIPA “erroneously block a huge amount of
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.”117 The panel held
further that software filtering programs inevitably over-block
harmless Internet content, which adults and minors have a First
Amendment right to access, and under-block obscene and child
pornographic content, which neither adults nor minors have a First
Amendment right to access.118 This is partly because the categories
used by such software for filtering purposes are broader than the
constitutional categories of unprotected speech defined by CIPA and
in part because of the imperfections in filtering software
technology.119 Accordingly, the panel concluded that “[g]iven the
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech blocked by
[filtering software],” CIPA was not narrowly tailored.120
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the
restrictions CIPA imposed on speech (or more precisely, the
restrictions that CIPA required libraries to impose on speech) were
not unconstitutional.121 The Justices, finding the statute
constitutional on its face, articulated several rationales for their

115. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 429–30 (E.D.
Pa. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
116. Id. at 428.
117. Id. at 448.
118. Id. at 475–79.
119. Id. at 476–77.
120. Id. at 476.
121. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003).
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conclusion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored a plurality
opinion in which Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined,
held that strict scrutiny was the wrong standard to apply. Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained that because providing Internet access
was not tantamount to creating a public forum, strict scrutiny was
not the proper level of scrutiny for analyzing CIPA’s
constitutionality.122 Because CIPA—unlike the CDA and COPA—
did not involve direct government regulation of Internet speech but
rather the regulation of Internet speech within a governmental
forum for speech, the Court turned to the public forum doctrine to
determine what level of scrutiny to apply.123 Under the public forum
doctrine, the level of scrutiny applicable to government regulation of
speech depends upon the characteristics of the forum in which the
speech is being regulated.124 If the governmental forum for speech at
issue is a “traditional public forum” or a “designated public forum,”
then strict scrutiny applies to any regulation of speech within that
forum.125 On the other hand, if the forum is a non-public forum,
then reduced scrutiny applies to speech regulations within such
forum.126
Chief Justice Rehnquist first explained that Internet access in
public libraries did not constitute a “traditional public forum” within
the constitutional meaning of that term because “this resource—
which did not exist until quite recently—has not ‘immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, . . .
been used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.’”127 Chief Justice
Rehnquist next explained that Internet access in public libraries did
not constitute a “designated public forum.” In order to create a
designated public forum, “the government must make an affirmative

122. Id. at 205–06. On this point, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that “we require the
Government to employ the least restrictive means only when the forum is a public one and
strict scrutiny applies.” Id. at 207 n.3.
123. Id. at 204–07.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 205–06.
126. Id. at 206–07.
127. Id. at 205 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 679 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Of course, given Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s formulation of the test for traditional public forums, it will be impossible for any
resource in a modern medium to fall within this definition.

1562

NUNZIATO.FIN

1535]

2/4/2008 9:38 AM

Technology and Pornography

choice to open up its property for use as a public forum.”128
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, “[a] public library does not
acquire Internet terminals in order to create a public forum for Web
publishers to express themselves, [but rather] . . . to facilitate
research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials
of requisite and appropriate quality.”129 Chief Justice Rehnquist
continued that “[e]ven if appellees had proffered more persuasive
evidence that public libraries intended to create a forum for speech
by connecting to the Internet, we would hesitate to import the
‘public forum doctrine . . . wholesale into’ the context of the
Internet.”130
Having concluded that libraries’ provision of Internet access did
not constitute a public forum, Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed
CIPA’s constitutionality within a reduced-scrutiny framework,
inquiring whether libraries’ use of filtering software as mandated by
CIPA was “reasonable.”131
Chief Justice Rehnquist considered but rejected the argument
that the “overblocking” inherent in filtering software rendered the
statute unconstitutional.132 In reaching this conclusion, he relied
upon representations of the Solicitor General at oral argument that
libraries would allow any adult patron to have erroneously blocked
sites unblocked and/or software filters disabled upon request:
Assuming that such erroneous blocking presents constitutional
difficulties, any such concerns are dispelled by the ease with which
patrons may have the filtering software disabled. When a patron
encounters a blocked site, he need only ask a librarian to unblock it
or (at least in the case of adults) disable the filter. As the District
Court found, libraries have the capacity to permanently unblock
any erroneously blocked site, and the Solicitor General stated at
oral argument that a “library may . . . eliminate the filtering with
respect to specific sites . . . at the request of a patron.” With respect
to adults, CIPA also expressly authorizes library officials to

128. Id. at 206.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 207 n.3 (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Id. at 208 (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for public libraries to . . . exclude certain
categories of content, without making individualized judgments that everything they do make
available has requisite and appropriate quality.”).
132. Id. at 208–09.
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“disable” a filter altogether “to enable access for bona fide research
or other lawful purposes.” The Solicitor General confirmed that a
“librarian can, in response to a request from a patron, unblock the
filtering mechanism altogether,” and further explained that a
patron would not “have to explain . . . why he was asking a site to
be unblocked or the filtering to be disabled.”133

Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that because libraries’
provision of Internet access did not constitute a traditional or
designated public forum, strict scrutiny did not apply, and CIPA
readily satisfied the scrutiny applicable to content-based restrictions
of speech within non-public forums.134
D. The Child Online Protection Act—Rounds 2 and 3
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of COPA
for the second time in 2004. In Ashcroft v. ACLU,135 the Court held
that the ACLU was likely to prevail on its claim that COPA facially
violates the First Amendment because it is not the least restrictive
alternative to advancing Congress’s compelling interest.136 Because
COPA embodies a content-based restriction on speech subject to
strict scrutiny, the Government was required to meet its burden of
establishing that the ACLU’s proffered alternatives, including userbased software filters, were not as effective as and were less speech
restrictive than COPA. As the Court explained in Reno v. ACLU,137
a statute that “effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one
another . . . is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at
least as effective in achieving the [statute’s purpose.]”138 The
Supreme Court held that the Government failed to prove that it
would be likely to defeat the ACLU’s claim that software filters
constitute a less restrictive alternative to COPA.139 Contrasting the
efficacy and speech restrictiveness of software filters and COPA, the
Supreme Court credited the district court’s analysis of the greater

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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542 U.S. 656 (2004).
Id. at 666.
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efficacy of software filters compared to COPA’s criminal
prohibitions.140 Accordingly, the Court concluded that “blocking or
filtering technology may be at least as successful as COPA would be
in restricting minors’ access to harmful material online without
imposing the burden on constitutionally protected speech that
COPA imposes on adult users or Web site operators.”141
Justice Kennedy explained that the efficacy of software filters
likely rendered COPA unconstitutional both because filters were less
restrictive than COPA and because filters were likely more effective
than COPA.142 First, “filters are less restrictive than COPA [because]
[t]hey impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end,
not universal restrictions at the source.”143 Accordingly, adults
without children who wish to receive harmful-to-minors content can
readily obtain such content by not using filters, and even adults with
children who employ filters can simply disable the filters to access
such content.144 Most importantly, Justice Kennedy held, because a
filtering regime does not “condemn as criminal any category of
speech,” the potential chilling effect on sexually-themed speech is
greatly diminished under a filtering regime as compared to COPA’s
scheme.145
Justice Kennedy explained further that filters are likely more
effective than COPA because their use can prevent minors from
viewing pornography that originates outside of the United States and
from accessing pornographic content that is available via Internet
avenues other than the World Wide Web.146 Because COPA extends
only to content that originates within the United States, it only
reaches approximately 60% of harmful-to-minors content (the other
40% of which originates overseas).147 Filters, in contrast, which are
imposed on the receiving end, can block harmful-to-minors content
regardless of its geographic origin, and extend to all forms of
Internet communication, not just material originating from the

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 666–73
Id. at 663 (quoting COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
Id. at 665–70.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 667.
Id.
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World Wide Web.148 As Justice Kennedy noted, the Commission on
Child Online Protection, created by Congress under the COPA
statute, unambiguously found that filters were more effective than
the adult verification schemes embodied in COPA.149
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that filters were not a perfect
solution because they inevitably underblock and overblock content.
Nevertheless, he concluded that the Government failed to satisfy its
burden of showing that filters were less effective than COPA.150
Accordingly, he concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for
the district court to preliminarily enjoin the statute pending a full
trial on the merits, in which the Government would be required to
prove that filters were not less restrictive than COPA in order to save
COPA from being permanently enjoined.151
Justice Breyer, in his dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O’Connor, criticized the burden that the majority
imposed upon the Government of proving that filtering software was
a less restrictive alternative than COPA.152 According to Justice
Breyer, filtering software should not be analyzed as an alternative to
COPA because it is not an “alternative legislative approach.”153
Rather, he explained, filtering software is
part of the status quo, i.e., the backdrop against which Congress
enacted [COPA]. It is always true, by definition, that the status
quo is less restrictive than a new regulatory law. It is always less
restrictive to do nothing than to do something. But “doing
nothing” does not address the problem Congress sought to
address—namely, that, despite the availability of filtering software,
children were still being exposed to harmful material on the
Internet.154

Justice Breyer criticized the majority for requiring the
Government to disprove the existence of “magic solutions”—
filtering regimes in which, for example, the “Government [gave] all
parents, schools, and Internet cafes free computers with filtering

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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programs already installed, hire[d] federal employees to train parents
and teachers on their use, and devote[d] millions of dollars to the
development of better software.”155 It is unclear, however, why such
an alternative would be infeasible. In regulating this area in the past,
the government has compared blanket prohibitions on sexuallythemed content to potential technological solutions that would
empower parents and require them to exercise control over such
content, and it has struck down such blanket prohibitions in favor of
technological solutions for parents.156 Furthermore, in the Internet
context, Congress has already strongly encouraged the use of filters
by public schools and libraries under CIPA,157 and it could enter or
intervene in the filtering software market to facilitate the translation
of obscenity and harmful-to-minors constitutional standards to the
software code that implements content filtering.
The Government attempted to meet its burden of sustaining the
enforceability of COPA in a full trial on the merits held in November
2006 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.158 In attempting to
meet this burden, the Government focused primarily on the two
aspects of the comparative analysis of COPA and the filtering
schemes that were emphasized by Justice Kennedy.159 First, the
Government contended that COPA can be enforced against foreign
Web site operators, either directly under multilateral treaties or
indirectly by regulating the credit card companies that facilitate
access to such content originating overseas under merchant
agreements that require foreign merchants selling goods and services
to U.S. customers to comply with laws that are unique to the United
States (such as COPA).160 Accordingly, the Government contended
that filtering schemes (that filter sexually-themed content originating
within and outside the United States) are not comparatively more
effective than COPA on the grounds of their international reach.161
Second, the Government contended that a filtering scheme
would not constitute a less restrictive and equally effective alternative
to COPA because filters substantially underblock and overblock
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 688.
Id. at 670.
47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
ACLU v. Gonzalez, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
Id. at 810–11.
Id.
Id. at 811.
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material and are often implemented improperly and ineffectively.162
The Government presented the results of studies conducted by its
experts using the best filters on the market as applied to three large
representative data sets.163 These experts concluded that if
underblocking by filtering is minimized, then overblocking is
prevalent, and vice versa, because configuring a filter to block all
harmful-to-minors material inherently overblocks, while configuring
a filter to allow receipt of all non-harmful-to-minors material
inherently underblocks.164 The Government contended further that,
in addition to the underblocking and overblocking inherent in the
use of even the best filtering software, minors are frequently able to
circumvent such filters with the assistance of information that is
readily available on the Internet.165 COPA, by contrast, which
imposes restrictions on the source, cannot be circumvented, and is
therefore more effective than a filtering scheme.166
The ACLU responded that, despite the Government’s arguments
that COPA was applicable to Internet content originating overseas,
there were insurmountable obstacles to granting extraterritorial
effect to COPA.167 First, it would likely be difficult to establish
personal jurisdiction over a foreign Internet content provider.168
Even if the Government could establish jurisdiction, a criminal
sanction imposed under COPA would be difficult or impossible to
enforce in another country.169 Extradition would not be a viable
option in the COPA context because many extradition treaties
require the offense to be a crime both in the United States and in the
country from which the individual is being extradited, which would
likely not be the case with a COPA violation. Thus, the ACLU
argued, end-user filters are more effective than COPA because they
can block the forty percent of harmful-to-minors content that
originates overseas, while COPA cannot extend to such content.170
Finally, the ACLU contended that filters are more effective than

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
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COPA because, while COPA applies only to World Wide Web
content, filters can also block other types of harmful Internet
communications, including communications via email, chat, instant
messaging, peer-to-peer, streaming audio and video, Voice over
Internet Protocol, and television over the Internet.171
The district court essentially sided with the ACLU. First, it
concluded that COPA was not narrowly tailored to serve Congress’s
compelling interest in protecting minors from exposure to sexuallyexplicit material on the World Wide Web because it is overinclusive,
in that it prohibits far more speech than is necessary to advance the
government’s interest, and because it is underinclusive, in that it
does not reach the significant amount of sexually explicit online
material that originates overseas.172 Nor do the statute’s affirmative
defenses render it narrowly tailored. Age verification as currently
implemented is ineffective and/or unduly burdens protected
speech.173 Age verification tools are not widely available or
implemented, and content providers cannot effectively verify age
through credit cards and debit cards because (1) card issuers prohibit
their use to verify age, (2) a substantial number of minors have access
to such cards, and (3) many adults do not own credit cards or are
unwilling to provide credit card information online.174
The district court also agreed with the ACLU’s argument that
COPA is not the least restrictive alternative available and that
filtering technologies were less restrictive and at least as—and likely
more—effective than COPA in restricting minors’ access to harmful
material online.175 First, COPA embodies criminal provisions, which
unavoidably chill some protected speech, while legislation relying on
filtering would not similarly embody fines or prison sentences.176
Congress could enact programs to promote and support the use of
filtering software and provide parents with the ability to monitor
their children’s Internet access, without subjecting protected speech
to severe criminal penalties, as COPA’s scheme does.177 Second,
filters are at least as—and likely more—effective than COPA in
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 815.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 811–13.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 813–16.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 814.
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restricting minors’ access to harmful Internet speech.178 Filters can
reach substantially more overseas-originating sites than COPA and
can also reach a wide array of Internet content, whereas COPA is
arguably limited to domestic sites using the HTTP or successor
protocols.179 Finally, the court concluded that COPA was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.180
The Government appealed the district court’s decision to the
Third Circuit, and the Supreme Court will likely grant certiorari to
weigh in for the third time on the constitutionality of COPA (this
time, with the benefit of a full trial on the merits). The Court’s
decision (like the district court’s) will likely rest on the comparative
efficacy and speech-restrictiveness of COPA and software-filtering
schemes.
E. Lessons Learned
Several overarching themes emerge from the above analysis of
the courts’ scrutiny of the three major statutes restricting minors’
access to sexually-themed Internet expression. First, courts prefer
regulations that empower the end user to screen out harmful content
on the receiving end, rather than regulations punishing the content
provider for failing to initially screen out harmful content. As Justice
Kennedy explained in Ashcroft v. ACLU, “filters are less restrictive
than COPA [in that] they impose selective restrictions on speech at
the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source.”181 Second,
with regard to regulations empowering the end user to screen out
harmful content on the receiving end, courts will look carefully at
whether the choice to screen or filter can be easily undone (so that
adults can ultimately access the full panoply of speech that they have
a constitutional right to access).182 Third, in applying strict
constitutional scrutiny to these statutes, courts will seriously inquire
into whether there are less speech-restrictive alternatives for
advancing the statute’s goal. If the ACLU can identify one such

178. Id. at 813–14.
179. Id. at 815.
180. Id. at 821.
181. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2002).
182. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 196 (2003) (upholding CIPA
because librarians could unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter without
significant delay on an adult user’s request).
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alternative, a court will likely strike down the statute. With these
principles in mind, I turn to an analysis of the constitutionality of the
proposed Internet Community Ports Act.
IV. THE INTERNET COMMUNITY PORTS ACT
One novel type of solution for restricting minors’ access to
sexually-themed Internet content is embodied in the proposed
Internet Community Ports Act (ICPA). ICPA capitalizes on the fact
that Internet content is transmitted via different ports or channels.183
If the dissemination of harmful-to-minors content can be restricted
to certain ports or channels, then users who choose not to receive
such content can configure their Internet access, with the help of
their ISPs, to ensure that they do not receive communications via
such restricted ports or channels.184 Under the port filtering scheme
contemplated in ICPA, only users who wish to receive
adult/harmful-to-minors Internet content will be able to receive it,
while Internet users who choose to receive only content that is
designated not harmful to minors will be shielded from adult
content.185 Below, I analyze the implementation and constitutional
implications of such a filtering scheme.
A. Internet Ports
ICPA’s regulatory scheme depends upon the ability to segregate
Internet content for dissemination on different Internet ports. All
Internet communications travel over ports, which are virtual
pathways used to direct various types of Internet activity and content
to their appropriate destinations.186 Unlike USB ports or parallel
ports on a computer, these Internet ports have no physical existence.
Rather, an Internet port is a special number present in the header of

183. See Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § V(44) (defining “Port(s)”); § V(9)
(defining “Community Port(s)”); § V(41) (defining “Open Port(s)”); see also CP80
Foundation,
Internet
Community
Ports
Act
of
2007,
http://www.cp80.org/resources/0000/0013/Internet_Community_Ports_Act.pdf. Cheryl
Preston, Professor of Law at Brigham Young University Law School, and the CP80
Foundation created and advocate adoption of the ICPA. At the time of writing, the ICPA has
not yet been introduced in either house of Congress.
184. Cheryl B. Preston, Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to Protecting Children
Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1431–34.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1427–31.
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each data packet of an Internet communication that is used to map
that data packet to a particular destination.187 Data packets are
routed from one port through an ISP to another port on the
intended recipient’s computer. There are 65,535 possible ports for
Internet communications, only a minor subset of which are
commonly used.188 By convention, certain ports are used for certain
types of Internet traffic. For example, ports 80 and 8080 are used for
Web page transmission over hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP
traffic); Port 110 is used for POP3 email traffic; Port 5190 is used
for AOL Instant Messenger traffic; Port 443 is used for encrypted
transmission of credit card and other secure data; and Port 666 is
used by the Internet game Doom.189 As with many other types of
standards on the Internet, the use of Internet ports is largely
governed by convention among the Internet community.
The organization responsible for registering and allocating port
numbers is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which
is operated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN), neither of which are governmental entities.190
Rather, these entities are sui generis Internet standard-setting and
policy-making bodies responsible for many aspects of Internet name
and number management.191 Among other functions, IANA is
responsible for maintaining a list of port assignments and uses. Ports
0–1023, designated the “Well Known Ports,” are assigned by IANA
and generally reserved for system processes.192 Ports 1024–49,151
are designated the “Registered Ports” and are coordinated and
approved by IANA.193 Ports 49,152–65,535 are designated
“Dynamic” or “Private Ports” and are unregulated by IANA.194
The designation of which port an Internet communication will
travel through is quite simple and straightforward and amounts to a
187. See Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § V(33) (defining of “Port(s)”).
188. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Port Numbers, http://www.iana.org/
assignments/port-numbers.
189. Port Numbers, supra note 188.
190. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, http://www.icann.
org/new.html. For a discussion of the non-governmental status and policy-making functions
of ICANN, see Dawn Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet
Governance, 52 EMORY L.J. 187 (2003).
191. Nunziato, supra note 190.
192. Port Numbers, supra note 188.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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few characters inserted in the HTML code associated with that
content. For example, to direct an HTML file associated with the
Smithsonian’s Web site, www.si.edu, to be transmitted over Port
50,000, the following code could be inserted in the HTML code
associated with the Web site: <a href=http://www.si.edu:50,000/
index.html>.
Content providers also have the ability to designate an individual
component of their Web site, such as a particular image file, for
transmission via a particular port. In order to direct only a particular
image file (for example, image.gif on the www.si.edu Web site) to be
transmitted and displayed on Port 50,000, the following code could
be used: <img src=http://www.si.edu:50,000/image.gif>.
It is a relatively straightforward process to block receipt of
Internet communications over certain ports. Using standard firewall
software, an Internet user or ISP can restrict the receipt of Internet
communications that are transmitted via designated ports. For
example, if a user (directly or via her ISP) chooses to restrict all
content transmitted via ports 50,000–65,535, she could employ
standard software to restrict her access to such content made
available through such ports. Unlike user-based filtering software,
which users (especially teenage users) frequently disable with ease,
port-filtering software imposed at the ISP level is much more
difficult to circumvent.
B. The Internet Community Ports Act
In an effort to capitalize on the availability of a vast number of
heretofore unutilized Internet ports, as well as on the ease with
which Internet content can be channeled to designated ports,
proponents of ICPA developed a proposal for regulating access to
certain sexually-themed Internet content based on Internet port
technology. ICPA would operate by setting forth a scheme for
channeling or filtering such content to certain ports and away from
those who choose not to access such content.195
First, the regulatory scheme contemplated by ICPA would
require the FCC to designate (1) a certain subset of available
Internet ports as “Open Ports,” over which all legal (e.g., nonobscene) Internet traffic could be disseminated, and (2) another

195. Preston, supra note 184, at 1431–34.
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subset of Internet ports known as “Community Ports,” which would
be restricted for the transmission of content that was not harmful to
minors.196 ICPA defines “Harmful to Minors”197 content in the same
way that “Harmful to Minors” content is defined under COPA,198
which definition was upheld by the Supreme Court in its first
consideration of COPA.199 The Act would make it a crime for a
content publisher to make “knowingly and with knowledge of the
character of the material, . . . by means of any Community Port,
make[] or cause[] to be made any Communication that is Obscene
Child Pornography, or Harmful to Minors.”200 While the Act also
provides separately for the liability of Internet Service Providers,201 I
focus my analysis primarily on the direct liability of content
publishers.
ICPA essentially operates by creating two zones for Internet
speech: an adult zone for all First Amendment-protected content,
and a minor zone for all content protected by the First Amendment
and not harmful to minors. If we assume that content providers are
able to determine which content properly belongs in which zone,
then the burden ICPA imposes on them, to direct appropriate
content to the appropriate zone, is insubstantial. That is, if we
assume a state of affairs in which (1) the proposed statute’s mandate
pre-existed the creation of the HTML code for each Web site and
(2) all Internet Web sites are either clearly harmful to minors or

196. See supra note 183.
197. ICPA defines “Harmful to Minors” any communication that:
i.
the average adult, applying a contemporary national standard, would find,
taking the Communication as a whole, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
ii. depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to Minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of
the genitals or post-pubescent female breast, or describes or depicts
Sexually Explicit Conduct; and
iii. taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
for Minors.
Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § V(22).
198. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
199. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 579–81 (2002).
200. Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § II(1). The statute defines Content Publisher
as “any person who Transmits, publishes [or] broadcasts . . . a Communication,” id. § V(12),
where the Communication, in turn, includes “all data types and materials [transmitted via the
Internet, including] text, images, graphics, . . . video, [and] audio.” Id. § V(8).
201. Id. § II(1).
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clearly not harmful to minors, then the burden on the content
provider seems minimal. The content provider responsible for each
Web site need only insert a small line of code in the site’s HTML
code at the time of the Web site’s creation to designate the type of
port—Open or Community—over which such content would be
made available. Because ICPA appears to impose minimal burdens
on content providers in designating their content for the adult zone
or the minor zone, proponents of ICPA might prevail on the courts
to scrutinize the proposed Act as a zoning law subject to less than
strict scrutiny. Because the Act arguably channels but does not
restrict or burden speech based on content, proponents may contend
that the Act merely regulates the place or manner in which speech is
communicated and that the Act is therefore properly subject to
reduced scrutiny as a time, place, or manner regulation of speech.
Proponents may contend that ICPA operates in much the same
way as real-space zoning laws that have been upheld by the Supreme
Court. As Justice O’Connor explained in her concurrence/dissent in
Reno v. ACLU,202 the Court has upheld real-space zoning laws that
create separate adult zones and minor zones, where such laws do not
“unduly restrict adult access to [adult] material; and [] minors have
no First Amendment right to read or view the banned material.”203
Zoning laws that prohibit minors from accessing harmful-to-minors
material, while allowing adults unburdened access to such material,
have been upheld when applied to real space. If legislators could
accurately map such a regulatory regime onto cyberspace, as Justice
O’Connor envisioned in Reno v. ACLU, the Court would likely
uphold that scheme as well.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld real-space zoning laws
that regulate the place in which adult content can be disseminated
and has subjected such zoning laws to reduced scrutiny. In City of
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., for example, the Court upheld a
city zoning ordinance prohibiting such theaters from operating near
schools, residences, parks, and similar locations, against an adult
theater’s challenge.204 The Court held that because the ordinance did
not ban such adult speech altogether, but rather sought to channel it
into certain locations, the ordinance was properly construed as a

202. 521 U.S. 844, 886 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 887–88.
204. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986).
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time, place, or manner regulation subject to reduced scrutiny.205
Such regulations are acceptable, the Court held, as long as they “are
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”206 Under
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, however,
time, place, and manner restrictions are subject to reduced scrutiny
in part because they are content-neutral. A regulation that zones
speech based on its content may be a “place” regulation but is not
necessarily a content-neutral one. In construing the City of Renton’s
regulation of sexually-explicit theaters, the Court wrestled with the
issue of whether the ordinance was content-neutral or content-based
and ultimately determined that because the City did not intend to
suppress or restrict the message communicated by such theaters in
enacting the ordinance, the ordinance did not regulate speech on the
basis of its content.207 Quoting Justice Powell’s opinion in Young v.
American Mini Theaters, Inc.,208 the Renton Court observed that
“[i]f [the City] had been concerned with restricting the message
purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close them down
or restrict their numbers, rather than circumscribe their choice as to
location.”209
Accordingly, the Renton Court rejected the conclusion that the
ordinance was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, holding
instead that the regulation, like the one at issue in Young, involved
“a decision by the city to treat certain movie theaters differently
because they have markedly different effects on their
surroundings.”210 In particular, the Court credited the City’s findings
that the un-zoned presence of adult theaters had an adverse effect on
neighborhood children and contributed to declining neighborhood
property values, both of which the Court found to be secondary
effects of adult theaters on their surroundings, not primary effects of
the content of such speech.211 Concluding that the Renton ordinance
was aimed at reducing these harmful secondary effects and not at

205. Id. at 48–49.
206. Id. at 47.
207. Id. at 48, 51.
208. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
209. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
210. Id. at 49 (quotation marks omitted).
211. Id. at 48.
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suppressing the content conveyed by adult theaters, the Court found
that the regulation was properly categorized as a content-neutral
time, place, or manner regulation that was constitutional because it
left open ample alternative avenues for communication (five percent
of the City’s area)212 and served substantial government interests
(reducing adverse effects on neighborhood children and ameliorating
neighborhood blight).213
The Renton and Young line of cases has been strongly criticized
for classifying the regulations involved as content-neutral and for
applying reduced scrutiny to the regulations.214 The zoning
regulations at issue in these cases undeniably subject sexually-explicit
speech to greater burdens than non-sexually-explicit speech.215
Despite these trenchant criticisms, these real-space zoning cases
appear to remain viable precedents from which to defend the
constitutionality of statutes that regulate the place or manner of
distribution of sexually-themed expression based on the effects of
such expression on minors. Indeed, proponents of ICPA have a
stronger argument in defense of the proposed statute’s
constitutionality than the proponents of the real-space zoning
ordinances at issue in Renton and Young. ICPA’s manner of zoning
speech leaves open far more alternative avenues for communication
than the real-space zoning regulations upheld by the Court in
Renton and Young. Considering that the vast majority of Internet
content is currently disseminated via only one port (Port 80, the
conventional port for HTTP traffic), ICPA’s proposed port
limitation of sexually-themed Internet expression would easily satisfy
the “ample alternative avenues of communication” component of
this analysis.
In supporting the constitutionality of ICPA based on the realspace zoning line of cases, defenders of the statute would also need
to identify and document the negative effects of “harmful-to212. Id. at 53.
213. Id. at 50–51; see also City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (ban on
completely nude dancing is aimed at secondary effects of such dancing, not at message
expressed by dancers, and therefore the ban is subject to intermediate not strict scrutiny);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (same).
214. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL L. REV. 49, 60 (2000)
(criticizing the Renton Court for confusing content neutrality with the question of whether the
law is justified).
215. Id. at 60–61.
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minors” speech by providing evidence of the effects of such
expression on the psychological well-being of children. If defenders
of the statute could convince the Court that the legislation does not
aim at suppressing or restricting adult content because it conveys
harmful ideas, but rather aims at channeling such content away from
minors because of the psychological or other harms that result from
minors’ early exposure to such content, they might convince the
court that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate and that the statute
survives such scrutiny. Surely, if protection against declining property
values is a substantial government interest (as the Court found in
Renton), preventing harm to children’s psychological well-being
would constitute a substantial government interest as well.
Accordingly, if defenders of the proposed statute were able to
convince the Court to scrutinize the statute as a content-neutral
regulation aimed at reducing the harmful secondary effects of
sexually-themed expression on minors under the Young and Renton
line of cases, the statute would likely withstand such scrutiny.
If the reviewing court declined to subject ICPA to intermediate
scrutiny and instead imposed strict scrutiny, the burdens imposed by
ICPA on content providers and Internet end users, as well as the
Court’s assessment of those burdens, would depend in part on which
ports are designated for adult content and which are designated for
minors’ content. If the default under ICPA were that all HTTP
traffic would continue to travel over Port 80 (the conventional port
for all HTTP traffic), then ICPA would merely impose an
insubstantial (and optional) burden on providers of non-harmful-tominors content to direct their content to be disseminated via a
Community Port. For example, under ICPA’s scheme, the publishers
of the National Zoo’s Web site would be encouraged to disseminate
their content via Community Ports so that those individuals
choosing to receive only non-harmful-to-minors content could
access the Zoo’s site with the assurance that no harmful-to-minors
content would be available to them.
Because ICPA imposes optional and technologically
straightforward requirements, the burdens it imposes on content
providers are minimal, but so are the likely benefits accruing from
the statute. If the statute operates to leave the default port
allocations in place and to require a Web site essentially to certify,
upon pain of penalty, that its content is not harmful to minors (in
order to designate transmission of such content via a Community
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Port), then it is likely that very few sites will choose to do so. In this
case, ICPA will probably share the same fate as the .KIDS.US
domain name space, created in 2002 as a zone for guaranteed kidfriendly content—free of violence, pornography, and other material
inappropriate for minors. The Dot Kids Implementation and
Efficiency Act of 2002216 directed the creation of the .KIDS.US
domain space that would contain only content that is (1) not
“harmful to minors,” as that term is defined in COPA, and (2)
“suitable for minors” less than thirteen years of age.217 This Act
defines content “suitable for minors” as content that is “not
psychologically or intellectually inappropriate for minors,” and
“serves
the
educational,
informational,
intellectual, . . .
cognitive . . .[,] social, emotional, or entertainment needs of
minors.”218 The Act charged NeuStar, the administrator of the U.S.
country code top-level domain, with establishing and administering
the .KIDS.US domain space, and with the responsibility of
prescreening all content to determine whether it complies with the
legal requirements for this domain space.219
Although the .KIDS.US domain space imposed minor
technological and financial burdens on content providers seeking to
make their content available in this space, only a handful of content
providers have made the determination that the burdens were
worthwhile to assume; by all accounts, the .KIDS.US domain space
is quite meagerly populated.220 And it is likely that ICPA would
suffer the same fate if interpreted to require providers of not
harmful-to-minors content to opt in to dissemination of such
content via a Community Port, under pain of criminal penalties.
Although the ICPA minors’ zone is slightly easier to opt into than is
the .KIDS.US zone, and although it is easier for minors to hack
around .KIDS.US content restrictions than to hack around the ICPA
content restrictions, it is nonetheless likely that content providers

216. Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-317, § 157,
116 Stat. 2766 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
217. Id. § 157(j)(1)–(2).
218. Id. § 157(j)(5), 116 Stat, at 2770–71.
219. See generally id. § 157.
220. As of September 29, 2006, the top-level domain name “kids.us” contained twentytwo Web sites. One of those Web sites is an index for the other sites. Two of those Web sites
are defunct.

1579

NUNZIATO.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/4/2008 9:38 AM

[2007

would find that the benefits of opting into this minors’ zone would
not exceed its actual and potential costs.
Consider, for example, the National Zoo’s likely cost-benefit
analysis in determining whether to make its Web site available via a
Community Port under ICPA. Although such a designation entails
minimal financial and technological burdens, the publisher may
nonetheless determine that the risk of penalty is too great and is not
outweighed by the benefits of publishing its content via a
Community Port. By publishing via a Community Port, the National
Zoo must be prepared to certify that all content on its Web site—
thousands of images, videos, and text pages, some of which may be
interactive or created by third parties real-time—is not harmful to
minors. Given that the Zoo’s Web site may contain content that, for
example, depicts or describes animals’ sexual activity (and given that
such conduct could fall within the statutory definition of harmful-tominors content221), the publisher of the Zoo’s Web site might
reasonably determine that the added benefit of publishing via a
Community Port is not worth the risk. Proponents of ICPA might
respond that a Web publisher like the National Zoo could easily
designate any individual controversial image or video (e.g. the live
Panda mating cam) on its Web site for dissemination via an Open
Port, while the rest of the site’s content could continue to be made
available via Community Ports. Once again, however, although this
segregation of the Web site’s content is technologically feasible, the
content provider would likely determine that the benefit of having
part of its site accessible via Community Ports would not outweigh
the costs of determining whether each individual item of content on
its site was harmful to minors or not.
If ICPA is interpreted so that the default HTTP port 80 is
designated as a Community Port, such an interpretation would have
different and more profound constitutional implications. It would
require all Web sites with any content that is arguably harmful to
minors to reconfigure all of their HTML code and re-designate the
port for the transmission of such content (e.g., to designate a port
other than Port 80). Although, as discussed above, the designation
itself is not technologically burdensome, such a requirement would
substantially and unconstitutionally restrict speech.

221. Preston, supra note 6, at 1471 app. § V(22).
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Upon passage of ICPA, the vast majority of content providers
may determine that it is simply not worth the risk to publish any
content via Community Ports, and/or that it is too complicated to
parse out their sites’ adult content from its minor content.
Accordingly, most content providers would simply decide to
designate all content for publication via Open Ports. This conclusion
would apply with respect to Web sites that are interactive and that
host content posted by third parties. The risk that third parties
would post harmful-to-minors content cannot be ignored, and a
Web site publisher would likely not risk penalties under the Act just
for the benefit (if any) of making its content available via
Community Ports. Because a great number of Web sites have some
interactive component, ICPA may operate to encourage the vast
majority of Web sites to publish via Open Ports.
ICPA proponents may emphasize that the statute’s prohibitions
apply only to content publishers who “knowingly and with
knowledge of the character of the material” publish content that is
harmful to minors via a Community Port222 and that a provider of an
interactive Web site would not necessarily be charged with
knowledge of the character of content hosted by third parties.
Prosecutors might contend that at some point it is reasonable to
charge a Web site publisher with knowledge of the character of
content made available on its Web site. Given the uncertainties in the
statute’s application, it is likely that an interactive Web site publisher
would simply choose to publish all of its content via Open Ports, and
avoid the risk inherent in publishing content via Community Ports.
C. The User’s Perspective
The above analysis suggests that, regardless of whether Port 80
(the conventional port for HTTP Internet traffic) is designated as a
Community Port or an Open Port under ICPA, the vast majority of
Web sites will seek to avoid liability under ICPA and will simply
choose to publish their content via Open Ports. The result will likely
be similar to the experience under the .KIDS.US domain space, in
which the majority of child-oriented Web sites have declined to risk
liability for publishing content potentially harmful to minors and/or
unsuitable for minors within this domain space. Accordingly, it is

222. See id. II(1).
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likely that under ICPA, very few Web sites will choose to publish
their content via Community Ports. For schools, libraries, and
households that, pursuant to the ICPA regulatory scheme, instruct
their ISPs to allow only Community Port content to be made
available to them, ICPA will effectively operate to vastly limit the
amount of Internet content available to such users. As a result, ICPA
will substantially overblock harmful content, and as a result will not
be narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling government interest
of restricting minors’ access to harmful Internet content. Under this
scenario, ICPA will substantially overblock users’ access to nonharmful Internet content.
Furthermore, once an Internet user has instructed her ISP to
make only Community-Port content available to her, it will not be
possible for anyone at any time to access Open-Port content on the
user’s computer while that designation is in place. Thus, if a
household with minor children elects to receive only Community
Port content to restrict the children’s access to “Adult” content, it
would not be possible for the parents to switch off this election and
receive content via Open Ports once the children are asleep. Userbased filtering software allows multiple users of the same computer
to have different types of access, and allows parents unfiltered access
to Internet content at designated times of day (or all the time). In
contrast, as contemplated under ICPA, the decision to receive
communication only through Community Ports cannot be readily
modified. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in analyzing the CIPA
statute, placed substantial emphasis on the fact that the software
filters could be removed upon an adult’s request so that adults were
granted relatively easy access to the full panoply of Internet content
that they had a constitutional right to access. ICPA’s screening of
Internet content is not so easily reversible. Accordingly, although
ICPA imposes minor technological and financial burdens on content
providers by designating which types of ports can be used, it would
likely operate to substantially restrict the speech available to those
who receive content over Community Ports. For this reason, a
reviewing court would likely find that ICPA operated to substantially
overblock harmful speech. As a result, a court scrutinizing the
constitutionally of ICPA under a strict scrutiny standard would likely
find that there are less speech-restrictive alternatives—viz., userbased software filters—available to advance Congress’s compelling
interest of protecting minors from harmful, sexually-themed
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expression on the Internet. Accordingly, ICPA would ultimately
suffer the same fate as COPA, in that a reviewing court applying
strict scrutiny to the statute would likely determine that it was not
the least restrictive means of restricting minors’ access to sexuallythemed Internet expression because user-based software filters are
less speech-restrictive—in that they overblock less constitutionallyprotected speech and can be turned off to allow adults to access the
full panoply of Internet speech that they have a constitutional right
to enjoy.
V. CONCLUSION
The above constitutional analysis of the three major statutes
restricting minors’ access to sexually-themed Internet expression
suggests three conclusions relevant to an assessment of
constitutionality. First, courts have indicated a clear preference for
regulation empowering end users to screen out harmful content on
the receiving end over regulation punishing content providers for
failing to screen out harmful content at its source. Because ICPA
ultimately regulates and punishes content providers for failing to
screen out harmful content at its source, it will be disfavored by the
courts relative to regulations empowering end users to screen out
harmful content on the receiving end. Second, even if ICPA is styled
as a regulation empowering end users to screen out harmful content
on the receiving end, courts will look carefully at whether the choice
to screen or filter can be easily undone (so that adults can ultimately
access the full panoply of speech that they have a constitutional right
to access). ICPA’s port-filtering scheme operates between ISPs and
end users to make it very difficult for end users to undo the decision
to filter out content from certain ports and renders it virtually
impossible for adults in a “Community Ports only” household to
access the full range of Internet content that they have a
constitutional right to access. Third, in applying strict constitutional
scrutiny to ICPA, a court will inquire into whether there are less
speech-restrictive alternatives for advancing the statute’s goal. If the
ACLU can identify one such alternative, the court will likely strike
down the statute. Because user-based software filters overblock
substantially less constitutionally-protected speech than does ICPA,
and because the decision to screen content with software filters can
be easily reversed, a court will likely conclude that there are indeed
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less speech-restrictive alternatives to ICPA and that ICPA is therefore
unconstitutional.
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